InstallFix vs ClickFix: Fake Claude Code Installers Spread Through Google Ads

Published: 2026-10-10 | By: Carlos Montiel | Reading time: ~5 minutes

Anyone who googles "claude mac" or "install Claude Code" can end up copying a command to the clipboard that isn’t the one shown on screen. Push Security documents a new campaign, published October 9, 2026, that combines malicious advertising with exactly that trick.

ClickFix and InstallFix: The Difference

ClickFix tricks the user with a fake error or captcha and asks them to paste a command into their terminal "to fix it". InstallFix, a term used by Push Security, is a variant: instead of inventing a problem, it clones the install page of a legitimate command-line tool (such as Claude Code) and swaps the install command for a malicious one.

ClickFix   → fake error/captcha  → "paste this command to fix it"
InstallFix → cloned install page → "paste this command to install"

InstallFix works well against technical users precisely because pasting a curl ... | bash line is the official way to install Claude Code. Nothing about the gesture looks odd to the user.

The First Wave: March 2026

According to BleepingComputer (March 6, 2026), Push Security had already documented cloned Claude Code pages promoted with Google Ads for searches like "Claude Code install". The copies were hosted on legitimate platforms such as Cloudflare Pages, Squarespace and Tencent EdgeOne. On Windows they used mshta.exe to fetch the payload, and on macOS, base64-encoded instructions. The malware delivered was Amatera Stealer, which steals cryptocurrency wallets, passwords, cookies and session tokens.

The October Campaign: Google Ads + Bing + a Compromised Site

BleepingComputer reported on October 9 that Push Security detected a malicious ad for the search "claude mac". The chain, which Push calls "Adception", has several hops:

Google ad that displays the legitimate domain bing.com
Bing click-tracking endpoint (bing.com/ck/a)
Compromised WordPress site that filters on the Bing referer
Final domain: claude-desk-code[.]com (fake installer)

The page shows the legitimate command curl -fsSL https://claude.ai/install.sh | bash, but when you click "copy" the clipboard receives a different one: it decodes a base64 URL and runs a .dat file with zsh. This campaign targets macOS. The researchers were unable to determine which malware is ultimately installed, so we can’t state the exact impact. Push is tracking other domains using the same technique under the label "AcSig".

Key point: the clipboard trick makes what you read and what you copy two different things. Inspecting the page isn’t enough; you have to inspect what you paste.

How to Protect Yourself

What this means for your company:
Install developer tools only from the official documentation, by typing the URL or using a bookmark, never from a sponsored ad.
Before running a pasted command, read it in the terminal without pressing Enter. If you see base64, unfamiliar URLs or .dat, don’t run it.
Consider installing AI CLIs from approved package managers or internal repositories instead of curl | bash scripts.
If someone on your team ran a suspicious command, treat it as compromised credentials: rotate passwords, tokens and API keys, and review active sessions.
Include "fake AI tool installers" in your developer security training.

We can help you define an AI tooling policy for your team: info@guatemalia.com.

Carlos Montiel
Enterprise AI Solutions Architect
Specialist in LLMs, Agents, and Orchestration
guatemalia.com/#contacto · info@guatemalia.com

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Contact Carlos Montiel

info@guatemalia.com