ChatGPT: How a Shared Package Repository Created a “Clipboard” Between Isolated Accounts

By Carlos Montiel | Enterprise AI Specialist
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Published: 2026-10-07 | By: Carlos Montiel | Reading time: ~5 minutes

Isolating every user in their own container doesn’t accomplish much if all the containers share a service with write permissions. Check Point Research showed that this is exactly what was happening with ChatGPT’s code execution, and the lesson applies to any multi-tenant agent platform.

The Finding: A Covert Channel Between Containers

Check Point Research described a covert channel that would let an attacker use a victim’s ChatGPT session to run hidden tasks with the tools, data, and connected apps available in that session. Each user runs code in their own isolated container, but those containers accessed the same internal package repository (JFrog Artifactory) to download dependencies.

How It Worked: Artifactory Properties as a “Clipboard”

The researchers observed that the credentials handed to the containers had enough permissions to attach and read metadata (properties) on repository items through Artifactory’s item management API, with no per-account isolation. By encoding data in those properties, containers belonging to different users could exchange information through the shared service: in the report’s words, a shared clipboard between isolated containers.

Container A (attacker) --writes--> properties in Artifactory <--reads-- Container B (victim) No per-account isolation: the shared service acts as a communication channel

The delivery vector could be a malicious prompt, a shared conversation, or a custom GPT. Once active, the channel allowed one visible and one hidden task flow to be processed within the same turn. In the demonstration, ChatGPT retrieved data from the victim’s Gmail while responding normally to the visible question; the only clue was a discreet “Talked to Gmail” label.

Current status: the research concluded in June 2026. According to Check Point, by the time they finished the report the cross-account channel was no longer available, and OpenAI confirmed that the vulnerable Artifactory instance had been decommissioned. The report contains no evidence of real-world exploitation; this is a research demonstration.

The Architecture Lesson: Secure the Resources, Not Just the Model

This case is not a model failure or a jailbreak. It is a classic tenant-isolation failure in the infrastructure surrounding the model. Check Point stresses that agentic platforms must protect every resource the model has access to: internal APIs, shared state, credentials, and tools, with per-tenant isolation and least privilege.

What This Means for a Company Using or Building Agents

If you buy AI platforms:

If you build your own agent platform: audit which credentials each sandbox receives, use read-only, per-tenant credentials for dependencies, and treat any shared resource as a potential side channel.

If you need a review of the isolation and permissions of your agents, write to us at info@guatemalia.com.

Carlos Montiel
Enterprise AI Solutions Architect
Specialist in LLMs, Agents, and Orchestration
guatemalia.com/#contacto · info@guatemalia.com

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Contact Carlos Montiel

info@guatemalia.com